Volume 36

Issue 3

Article 7

1991

Constitutional Law - State Buy American Statute Held a Valid
Exercise in Economic Protectionism
Caroline J. Hasson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Caroline J. Hasson, Constitutional Law - State Buy American Statute Held a Valid Exercise in Economic
Protectionism, 36 Vill. L. Rev. 905 (1991).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss3/7

This Issues in the Third Circuit is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger
School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor
of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.

Hasson: Constitutional Law - State Buy American Statute Held a Valid Exer

1991]
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-STATE

"Buy

AMERICAN"

STATUTE HELD A

VALID EXERCISE IN ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM.

Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania (1990)
I.

INTRODUCTION

Many states have responded to the burgeoning trade deficit, the increasing rate of unemployment, and the persistent threat of economic
recession by enacting protectionist procurement legislation.' These
protectionist provisions, commonly referred to as "Buy American" statutes, are designed to indirectly promote domestically produced goodsand thereby the American economy-by imposing restrictions on the
1. The tendency to employ protectionist measures in times of economic
distress has been widely documented. See J.

KLINE, STATE GOVERNMENT INFLUENCE IN U.S. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY 87 (1983) (addressing expanded

use of trade-restrictive actions in response to increased import penetration' of
domestic markets); H. MILNER, RESISTING PROTECTIONISM 5 (1988) (noting that
economic distress and instability are key indicators of increased protectionist
activity); Kentworthy, The Constitutionality of State Buy-American Laws, 50 UMKC L.

1 (1981) (recognizing use of protectionist provisions in direct response to
growing problems of economic recession, unemployment and fear of increased
penetration of domestic markets by foreign firms).
To date, at least 28 states have enacted some form of Buy American legislaREV.

tion. Note, United States andJapanese Government Procurement: The Impact on Trade
Relations, 62 WASH. U.L.Q. 127, 140 n.65 (1984); see, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 39-3-1 to

39-3-4 (1975 & Supp. 1990) (requiring all firms undertaking public works
projects to "agree[] to use ... [only] materials, supplies, and products manufactured, mined, processed or otherwise produced in the United States"); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 48, paras. 1801-1807 (1986) (mandating that "[e]ach contract for...
public works . . . contain a provision that steel products used or supplied in

performance of that contract... [be] manufactured or produced in the United
States"); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 5-16-8-1 to 5-16-8-5 (West 1989) (requiring acceptance only of bids using domestic steel products unless bid is 15% greater than
foreign counterpart); MD. STATE FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 17-301 to 17-306

(1988 & Supp. 1990) (directing that only American steel products be used in
performance of public works contracts); N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 146 (McKinney
1989) (requiring that only steel items "made in whole or substantial part in the
United States" be used in public works contracts); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73,
§§ 1881-1887 (Purdon Supp. 1990) (mandating that only domestically produced
steel be used in public works contracts); W. VA. CODE §§ 5-19-1 to 5-19-4
(1990) (requiring all aluminum, glass, or steel products used in public works
contracts be domestically produced).
The federal government has accorded similar preference to domestic producers in federal purchasing decisions since 1933. 41 U.S.C. §§ lOa-d (1988)
(directing that "only such ... articles, materials, and supplies as have been
mined or produced in the United States... be acquired for public use"). But see
Paton, Buy America Becomes Rallying Pointfor Firms, WASH. Bus. J., Dec. 4, 1989, at
11 (noting widespread purchase of foreign products in national defense projects
despite directives of Buy American Act of 1933 and belief that this abuse "hurts
U.S. manufacturers and leaves the U.S. overly dependent on foreign
technology").

(905)
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procurement of foreign products when goods are purchased by or for
2
the enacting state.
In Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania,3 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit evaluated the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's Buy American provision. 4 The statute at issue, the Pennsylvania Steel Products Procurement Act, 5 requires all steel products
purchased by any public agency engaged in a public works contract to be
domestically produced. 6 According to the Trojan Technologies court, the
Act is not unconstitutional but rather represents a valid exercise in eco7
nomic protectionism.
The Third Circuit's opinion in Trojan Technologies definitively established the constitutional standards to be applied by courts in the Third
Circuit when evaluating the validity of sub-national protective procurement legislation. 8 Additionally, the court's commerce clause analysis,
2. See Kentworthy, supra note 1, at 1-2 (addressing belief that protectionist
legislation benefits domestic industry and its workers by increasing demand for
domestically produced goods beyond what would normally occur); see, e.g., PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1883 (Purdon Supp. 1990) (noting that "Buy American"
requirement is designed to "aid and promote the development of the steel industry of the United States").

3. 916 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2814 (1991).
4. Id.
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 1881-1887. For the statutory language of all
relevant provisions, see infra note 6.
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 1881-1887. Pertinent definitions under this
statute include:
" 'STEEL PRODUCTS.' Products rolled, formed, shaped, drawn, ex-

truded, forged, cast, fabricated or otherwise similarly processed ...
from steel made in the United States.
"'PUBLIC

AGENCY.'"

(1) the Commonwealth and its departments, boards, commissions, and
agencies;
(2) counties, cities, boroughs, townships, school districts, and any

other governmental unit or district;
(3) the State Public School Building Authority, the State Highway and
Bridge Authority, and any other authority now in existence or hereafter
created or organized by the Commonwealth;
(4) all municipal or school or other authorities now in existence or
hereafter created or organized by any county, city, borough, township

or school district or combination thereof; and
(5) any and all other public bodies, authorities, officers, agencies or instrumentalities, whether exercising a governmental or proprietary

function.
" 'PUBLIC WORKS.' Any structure, building, highway, waterway, street,

bridge, transit system, airport or other betterment, work or improvement whether of a permanent or temporary nature and whether for
governmental or proprietary use." Id. § 1886.

7. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 905.
8. For a complete discussion of the constitutional standards applied by the
Third Circuit in Trojan Technologies, see infra notes 20-53 and accompanying text.
For an analysis of the Third Circuit's application of these standards, see infra
notes 60-90 and accompanying text.
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specifically its market participant discussion, established the bright-line
rule that local government units are mere subdivisions of the state. 9 As
such, the court concluded that a state can assert market participant status regardless of whether its participation in the marketplace occurs
through central state agencies or through local governmental units.' 0
This casebrief submits that while most of the Third Circuit's analysis provides useful guidance to courts in the Third Circuit, it's market
participant analysis may have improperly established a bright-line rule
where a more case-specific approach appears warranted.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 3, 1978, Pennsylvania enacted the Pennsylvania Steel
Products Procurement Act (the Act).' I The Act requires all suppliers
contracting with any public agency involved in a public works project to
utilize only steel products comprised of American-made steel. 12 Appellant Trojan Technologies, Inc. (Trojan), a Canadian corporation, produces a UV-2000 light water-disinfection system. 13 The system uses
steel components in its frame and its control box, and it is therefore
considered a "steel product" under the Act.' 4 Moreover, several Pennsylvania municipalities purchased the system for installation in wastewater and sewage treatment facilities, and the Act therefore requires
9. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 911. According to the Trojan Technologies
court, there is "no compelling analytical difference between a local government
unit and central state agencies." Id.
10. Id. The market participant exception to the commerce clause is of particular importance in this setting since it allows the enacting state to avoid a
commerce clause challenge altogether. See Coenen, Untanglingthe Market-Participant Exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REV. 395 (1989). For a
more complete discussion of the Third Circuit's market participant analysis, see
infra notes 27-39 and accompanying text.
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 1881-1887. For the statutory language of all
relevant provisions, see supra note 6.
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 1884-1886. The Act considers a product to be
comprised of domestic steel "only if at least 75% of the cost of the articles,
materials and supplies [contained in the product] have been mined, produced or
manufactured ... in the United States." Id. § 1886.
13. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 905. The UV-2000 system is designed
for use in industry, potable water plants, and residences. Id.
14. Id. The UV-2000 contains between four and eight ultraviolet lamps. Id.
These lamps are located within a UV Module, which, in turn, is encased within a
stainless steel frame. Id. In addition, the control box, which monitors the UV2000's operations, is composed entirely of stainless steel. Id.
Although these steel components constitute less than 15% of the system's
total cost, the system is nonetheless considered a "steel product" because the
statutory definition of steel product expressly includes machinery and equipment listed in United States Department of Commerce Standard Industrial Classification 35, and sewage purification equipment is a classification included
within this category. Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 742 F. Supp.
900, 904-05 (M.D. Pa. 1990).
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that all steel utilized in the system be American-made.' 5
On July 11, 1988, the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office requested documentation from Trojan confirming that the UV-2000 complied with the Act. 16 Before providing the requested documentation,
Trojan and its exclusive distributor in Pennsylvania, Kappe Associates,
Inc. (Kappe), filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania challenging the validity of the Act and seeking
an injunction to prevent its enforcement. 17 After a motion by defendants, the case was transferred to the Middle District of Pennsylvania
where, on cross motions for summary judgment, the court found the Act
constitutional and denied the plaintiffs' request for injunctive and declaratory relief.' 8 Trojan and Kappe appealed this decision to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 19
III.

DiscussioN

On appeal to the Third Circuit, Trojan and Kappe challenged the
constitutionality of the Act on five different grounds. Appellants contended that (1) the Act is preempted by various statutes and agreements
which govern foreign commerce, 20 (2) application of the Act violates the
15. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 905. Pennsylvania municipalities are explicitly included within the statute's definition of public agency. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 73, § 1886. Furthermore, the statute's expansive definition of public works
clearly includes the maintenance of waste-water and sewage treatment facilities
since these facilities at the very least constitute an improvement of a temporary
nature for governmental use. Id.
16. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 905. In addition to requesting documen tation from Trojan, the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office also requested
information from the municipal authorities that had purchased the system confirming their compliance with the Act's requirements. Id.
17. Id. Because Trojan did not provide the Attorney General with the requested information before beginning suit, there has been no final determination as to whether the statute was violated, nor have any sanctions as yet been
imposed. Id.
18. Trojan Technologies, 742 F. Supp. at 905. The district court first concluded that the Act does not violate the commerce clause because the "public
agencies applying the Act are no more than market participants ....
Id. at 902.
The court next found that since the Act does not "bring Pennsylvania into contact with a foreign government or with foreign affairs," it does not interfere with
the federal government's exercise of its foreign affairs power. Id. at 903. Finally, the district court determined that the Act is not preempted by any of the
asserted statutes or agreements, nor is its langauge unconstitutionally vague. Id.
at 903-04.
19. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d 903.
20. Id. at 905-09. Article VI of the United States Constitution establishes
the supremacy of federal law, the "Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. According to this provision, if a state law
directly conflicts with a legitimate federal law, the state law must be invalidated
to preserve "federal supremacy." See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§ 6-25, at 479-81 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that "[clourts assess the validity of state
regulation in independent constitutional terms only when Congress has not chosen to act").
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foreign commerce clause, 2 1 (3) the Act impermissibly impedes the federal government's exercise of the foreign relations power, 2 2 (4) the Act
is unconstitutionally vague 23 and (5) application of the Act violates the
24
equal protection clause.

A.

Preemption

In analyzing appellants' contentions, the Third Circuit first examined whether the Act is preempted by any federal statutes or trade
agreements.2 5 According to the Trojan Technologies court, the Act is not
The five agreements or statutes asserted by appellants as preempting the
Act include: (1) the Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, United States-Canada,
27 I.L.M. 281; (2) Agreement on Government Procurement, General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, April 12, 1979, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. 10403; (3) Steel
Import Stabilization Act of 1984, 19 U.S.C.A. § 2253 note (West Supp. 1990);
(4) Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 129 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.); and (5) Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 19 U.S.C.). For a complete discussion of the court's preemption
analysis, see infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
21. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 909-13. The foreign commerce clause of
the United States Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power "to
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. For a
complete discussion of the foreign commerce clause as applied by the Third
Circuit in the context of sub-national procurement legislation, see infra notes 2739 and accompanying text.
22. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 913-14. Article I, section 10 of the
United States Constitution mandates that "[n]o State shall enter into any Treaty,
Alliance, or Confederation .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. This section further
provides that "[n]o State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any
Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports ..
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. These
directives embody the general constitutional principle that all foreign policy is
formulated and administered at the national level, rather than being delegated
to the individual states. L. TRIBE, supra note 20, § 4-6, at 230. For a complete
discussion of the Third Circuit's foreign affairs analysis, see infra notes 40-45
and accompanying text.
23. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 914-15. In the context of state law, the
vagueness doctrine arises by implication from the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution. According to that provision, "[n]o State... shall...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Because due process requires "that persons be
given fair notice of what to avoid, and that the discretion of law enforcement
officials . . . be limited by explicit legislative standards," an indefinite or vague
provision "runs afoul of... [this] concept" and therefore should be found void.
L. TRIBE, supra note 20, § 12-31, at 1033. For a discussion of the vagueness
doctrine and how the Third Circuit applied it to state Buy American legislation,
see infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
24. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 915. The equal protection clause of the
United States Constitution directs that "[n]o State shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1. For a complete discussion of the Third Circuit's equal protection analysis,
see infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
25. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 906. For a list of the five statutes and
agreements asserted by appellants as preempting Pennsylvania's Buy American

provision, see supra note 20.
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preempted by federal law because none of the asserted agreements or
statutes "constitutes a comprehensive scheme so pervasive that it must
exclude all state action with respect to foreign steel nor are they otherwise sufficient to support an inference of Congressional intent to pre' 26
empt state buy-American legislation."
Appellants contended that each of the cited enactments alone creates an inference of congressional intent to preempt. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 906.
Additionally, appellants asserted that consideration of the agreements "in toto"
reveals an effort by Congress to establish a comprehensive scheme which forecloses the possibility of "supplemental state activity." Id.
In Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., the Supreme Court developed a framework for use in determining whether federal law preempts state legislation. 485
U.S. 293, 299-300 (1988). The Schneidewind Court held that state legislation is
proscribed if one of three conditions is satisfied: (1) Congress explicitly occupies
the regulatory field at issue; (2) Congress completely, although not explicitly, occupies the entire field of regulation, leaving no opportunity for the imposition of
supplemental state law; or (3) compliance with both the state and the federal law
is not possible. Id.
The Third Circuit adopted this framework in Trojan Technologies. Trojan
Technologies, 916 F.2d at 906. Moreover, the Trojan Technologies court concluded
that if the allegedly preempted field is considered a traditional function of the
state, then the congressional intent to preempt must be clear and manifest. Id.
(citingJones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)). According to the
Third Circuit, state procurement policy is such a field. Id.
26. Id. at 909. In undertaking its preemption analysis, the Trojan Technologies court first addressed the scope of the United States-Canada Free Trade
Agreement. Id. at 906-08. According to the Third Circuit, this agreement committed both the United States and Canada "to actively strive to achieve, as
quickly as possible, multilateral liberalization of international government procurement policies." Id. at 906 (quoting Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988,
United States-Canada, art. 1301, 27 I.L.M. 281). The court declined to find preemption, however, because it found the agreement's language "hortatory rather
than mandatory." Id. In fact, the court continued, "rather than explicitly preempting state buy-American statutes, the Agreement seems tacitly to acknowledge and permit them . . .[because] [t]he Annex . . .specifies fifty-four federal
agencies for coverage [and] [i]mplicit in this specific designation omitting the
states is Congress' acquiescence in, if not endorsement of, state buy-American
statutes," Id. at 907. The Trojan Technologies court also noted that the Agreement concerns fair trade, as opposed to free trade. Id. In concluding that this
emphasis on fair trade negates a finding of preemption, the court explained that
achieving United States-Canadian reciprocity in sub-national government procurement may require more than national legislation. While it
is clear that, on the United States' side, Congress would have authority
to act preemptively in this area as an exercise of its power over foreign
commerce, it is not at all clear that the Canadian Parliament has [such
preemptive] authority.
Id. at 907 n.6.
For a detailed discussion of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, see generally ASSESSING THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (M.
SMITH & F. STONE eds. 1987); W. DIEBOD, BILATERALISM, MULTILATERALISM AND
CANADA IN U.S. TRADE POLICY (1988); and TRADE-OFFS ON FREE TRADE-THE
CANADA-U.S.
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (M. GOLD & D. LEnTON-BROWN eds.
1988).
The Trojan Technologies court next addressed the Agreement on Government
Procurement, explaining that, although it contained language intended to promote equal treatment of both foreign and domestic products and suppliers, it
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The Foreign Commerce Clause

The Third Circuit next considered whether application of the Act
can withstand a commerce clause challenge. 27 Of particular importance
in the court's analysis was the threshold inquiry of whether Pennsylvania
was acting as a market participant when it enforced the provisions of the
Act in purchases by local governmental units.2 8 The Trojan Technologies
court began its market participant analysis by examining the Seventh
Circuit's opinion in W.C.M. Window Co. v. Bernardi.29 In Window, the Sev-

enth Circuit held that for purposes of the market participant exception
to the commerce clause, a municipality does not represent a mere extentoo purports to include onlyfederal agencies within its scope. Trojan Technologies,
916 F.2d at 908. According to the court, the exemption accorded state agencies
is especially evident because a provision in the Agreement explicitly requires the
national government to attempt to persuade local governments as to the advantages of free trade. Id. For a discussion of the Agreement on Government Procurement, see generally Note, supra note 1, at 150-60.
Additionally, the Trojan Technologies court evaluated whether the Steel Import Stabilization Act preempted Pennsylvania's Buy American provision. Trojan
Technologies, 916 F.2d at 908. In declining to find preemption, the court noted
that this provision merely "establishes a mechanism for imposing quantitative
limits on United States' steel imports. It does not, however, include regulations
of price, quality or other terms of trade that if present would indicate comprehensive regulation." Id.
Similarly, the Trojan Technologies court concluded that both the Trade Act of
1974 and the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 contain language too general to
indicate "comprehensive regulation." Id. at 908-09. The court determined that,
at most, the agreements suggest that Congress was aware of state activities influencing foreign commerce and that it nonetheless chose to restrict itself to only
"persuasive appeals rather than mandatory preemption." Id. at 909. For a more
detailed discussion of the Trade Act of 1974, see generally V. CANTO, THE DETERMINANTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF TRADE RESTRICTIONS IN THE U.S. ECONOMY

7-9 (1986). For a more detailed discussion of the Trade Agreements Act of
1979, see generally P. Ehrenhaft & C. Meriweather, The Trade Agreements Act of
1979: Small Aidfor Trade?, 58 TUL. L. REV. 1107 (1984).
27. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 909-13. The court's commerce clause
analysis involved an examination of two separate issues. Id. First, the court evaluated whether Pennsylvania was entitled to market participant protection. Id. at
910-11. Second, the court examined whether the foreign origin of the restricted
products should affect the outcome of its commerce clause analysis. Id. at 912.
28. Id. at 910. A state enacting Buy American legislation can avoid a commerce clause attack altogether if it can successfully bring its activities within the
market participant exception; therefore, the extent of direct participation in the

marketplace required before the state can qualify for this exception is an essential inquiry. See generally Coenen, supra note 10.
Appellants Trojan and Kappe asserted that market participant status was
not available to Pennsylvania because the state was not the actual purchaser of
the UV-2000 disinfection system; the purchases were instead consummated by
local governmental units. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 910. The appellants

contended that these local governmental units were separate and distinct from
the state and that any control exercised by the state over their purchases was
therefore an act of market regulation rather than market participation. Id.
29. 730 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1984).
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sion of the state, but is rather a separate and distinct entity. 30 The Third
Circuit rejected the Window court's distinction and instead concluded
that
because
under
Pennsylvania
law
local governmental
units/municipalities "exist only by grace of state authority and with such
powers as the state affirmatively provides," the state must also have the
ability to impose restrictions on the powers of these local bodies. 3 1
In reaching this conclusion, the Trojan Technologies court purported
to adhere to the Supreme Court's holding in White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc.32 In White, the Court upheld a directive
by the City of Boston mandating that all city and federally funded construction projects be completed by a work force comprised of at least
fifty percent Boston residents. 3" In so holding, the Court found it inconsequential that the order effectively controlled contracts to which the
city itself is not a party, namely employment contracts between private
contractors and their employees.3 4 Analogizing the factual scenario in
30. Id. at 495-96. In so holding, the Seventh Circuit invalidated an Illinois
statute that required all public works contractors to hire only Illinois-resident
employees. Id. at 496. The court noted that the state's preference law would

have survived a commerce clause challenge if its application had been limited
solely to construction projects in which the state participated either administratively or financially. Id. at 495. The statute applied, however, to "every public
construction contract in Illinois, even if the purchaser is a local school board, or
for that matter the local dog catcher," and the court therefore concluded that
market participant status was unavailable. Id. at 495-96.
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that for many purposes local governmental units are divisions of the state, but it nonetheless concluded that for

commerce clause analysis there is both an analytical and a quantitative difference

between a state mandating activity by a state agency and a state requiring the
same activity of local governmental units. Id. at 496. According to the court, the
analytical difference results from the general lack of state supervision and/or
funding in the majority of local public works projects. Id. Explaining the quantitative difference, the court noted that because a large percentage of public contracting occurs at the local level, to extend market participant protection to
cover all participation by the state, whether through its own agencies or through
local governmental units, "could do great damage to the principles of free trade
on which the negative commerce clause is based." Id.
31. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 911. The Third Circuit rejected the Window court's analytical distinction between central state agencies and local governmental units. Id. According to the court, because "[b]oth exist only through
affirmative acts of the state . . . [there is] no reason why, attendant on making
such affirmative grants of power, the Commonwealth may not also restrict the
contracting authority of (these] bodies." Id. Additionally, the Trojan Technologies
court declined to adopt the Window court's quantitative distinction. Id. In its
opinion, although local municipalities may conduct more public contracting
than central state agencies, this fact alone should not impair a public entity's
ability to claim market participant protection because "to accept [such an] argument would suggest the curious result that identical legislation adopted by small
and large states might suffer different constitutional fates." Id.
32. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
33. Id. at 205 n.l.
34. Id. at 211 n.7. To the extent the Mayor's executive order purported to
restrict only "a discrete, identifiable class of economic activity in which the city
[was] a major participant," the City's restrictions were held permissible under the
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White to the facts in Trojan Technologies, the Third Circuit deduced that
"[i]f employees of a private contractor can be thought to be in relationship with the city, we think it equally clear that suppliers of a local public
entity can be thought to be 'supplying for the state.' 35
After determining that Pennsylvania qualified for market participant
status, the Trojan Technologies court then considered whether the fact that
the excluded products were of foreign origin should affect the outcome
of its commerce clause analysis. 3 6 While recognizing that statutes which
affect foreign commerce are "subject to a more rigorous and searching
review," '3 7 the court nonetheless concluded that the Act can withstand
this heightened scrutiny since it (1) does not create any danger of multiof "conflictple taxation 3 8 and (2) does not require an accommodation
39
ing policy among multiple national sovereigns."
market participant exception to the commerce clause. Id. (emphasis added). According to the Court, the city was a "major participant" in the public works contracts at issue because it "expended its own funds in entering into [the]
Id.
I..."
at 214-15.
contracts .
Although the executive order also purported to restrict projects financed
with federal funds, these particular restrictions were justified without recourse to
the market participant exception because they were specifically directed by Congress. Id. at 213. Moreover, no dormant commerce clause issue existed for the
federal funding since "Congress, unlike a state legislature ...,is not limited by
any negative implications of the Commerce Clause in the exercise of its spending power." Id. at 213.
35. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 911.
36. Id. at 912. Because the products being proscribed by the Act are of
foreign origin, appellants contended that application of the Act unconstitutionally impairs Congress' ability to regulate foreign commerce. Id.
37. Id. (citing Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437 n.9 (1980)). The

Reeves Court recognized that "Commerce Clause scrutiny may well be more rigorous when a restraint on foreign commerce is alleged." Reeves, 447 U.S. at 437
n.9 (citingJapan Line, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979)).
In Japan Line, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a state may
constitutionally impose a "nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax on foreign-owned instrumentalities (cargo containers) of international commerce."
Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 435-36. In striking down the tax as a violation of the
foreign commerce clause, the Court noted that imposition of the tax would result in multiple taxation and would contradict federal policy already in existence.
Id. at 451-54. According to the Court, possible impairment of federal uniformity
was especially evident since "American-owned containers are not taxed in Japan
[and] [t]he risk of retaliation by Japan . ..is [therefore] acute, and .. .[will] be
felt by the Nation as a whole." Id. at 453.
Relying on the Supreme Court's opinion in Japan Line, the Trojan Technologies
court surmised that this "more rigorous and searching scrutiny" is satisfied if the
state statute (1) does not create a danger of multiple taxation and (2) does not
interfere with federal uniformity in an area where such uniformity is essential.
Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 912 (citingJapan Line, 441 U.S. at 446-48).
38. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 912. The Trojan Technologies court noted
that multiple taxation is not a concern implicated by the Act. Id. Clearly, the Act
does not impose taxes on foreign products; rather, it proscribes the purchase of
such products altogether. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 1881-1887 (Purdon
Supp. 1990).
39. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 912. According to the Third Circuit,
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The Foreign Affairs Power

The Third Circuit next evaluated whether application of the Act unconstitutionally interferes with the federal government's exercise of its
foreign affairs power. 40 Recognizing the well-settled rule that "any state
law that involves the state in the actual conduct of foreign affairs is unconstitutional, '" 4 ' the Trojan Technologies court noted that an exception
exists for state action that only has "some incidental or indirect effect in
foreign countries." 42 The court concluded that because the language of
the Act precludes the purchasing public agency from focusing its procurement decisions on the ideologies of the foreign government involved, 4 3 the statute does not directly interfere with the foreign relations
power of the federal government. 4 4 Furthermore, the court observed
state procurement policy is not an area that requires national uniformity. Id.
Because "Congress is aware of state activity to restrict procurement of foreign
goods... and yet has not imposed a policy of national uniformity," the court
concluded that state procurement policy "fits comfortably within the Supreme
Court's observation that nothing in 'the Foreign Commerce Clause insists that
the Federal Government speak with any particular voice.' " Id. (quoting Wardair
Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 13 (1985)).
40. Id. at 913-14. Appellants contended that "the Act intrudes into foreign
policy or international affairs, which is an area within the exclusive control of the
federal government." Trojan Technologies, 742 F. Supp. at 903.
41. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 913 (citing United States v. Pink, 315
U.S. 203, 233 (1942)). This rule, which was espoused by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Pink, derives from the notion that the "formulation and administration of foreign affairs is vested exclusively in the federal government." Id. In
Pink, the Court noted:
[T]here are limitations on the sovereignty of the States. No State can
rewrite our foreign policy to conform to its own domestic policies.
Power over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the
national government exclusively. It need not be so exercised as to conform to
state laws or state policies, whether they be expressed in constitutions, statutes, or
judicial decrees.
Pink, 315 U.S. at 233 (emphasis added).
42. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 913 (quoting Zschernig v. Miller, 389
U.S. 429, 433 (1968)). The "incidental or indirect effect" exception developed
because almost any state action will have some effect, however remote, on foreign

nations. These "incidental effects," however, are not what the foreign affairs
power is intended to proscribe. See Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947)

(upholding state statute under foreign affairs analysis since statute only created
an "incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries").
43. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1884 (Purdon Supp. 1990). Under section
1884 of the Act, "[e]very public agency shall require that every contract document for the construction ... of public works contain a provision that ... only
[domestically produced] steel products ... shall be used or supplied .... " Id.
As such, the Act prohibits the purchase of foreign products altogether, regardless of the political philosophy of their source. Id.
44. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 913. In finding no direct impact on the
federal government's exercise of foreign affairs, the Third Circuit compared the
Act with the statute at issue in Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). Trojan
Technologies, 916 F.2d at 913. In Zschernig, the Supreme Court reviewed a statute
which directed that non-resident aliens could not inherit from the estate of an
Oregon resident unless the alien could establish that: (1) his/her government
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that "while it is possible that sub-national government procurement restrictions may become a topic of intense international scrutiny .... that
45
possibility alone cannot justify this court's invalidation of [the Act]."
D.

The Vagueness Doctrine

The Trojan Technologies court then addressed appellants' contention
that the Act is void for vagueness. 4 6 The court emphasized that the Act
permitted Americans to inherit on the same terms as its citizens, (2) Americans
could receive in the United States the funds from foreign estates, and (3) his/her
government would not confiscate the proceeds obtained from the Oregon estate. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 430-31. Because the Oregon statute permitted "minute inquiries" by administrative agencies into the nature of the foreign
government involved, the Court invalidated the statute as directly interfering
with the effective exercise of foreign policy. Id. at 435.
Unlike the Oregon statute, the Act at issue in Trojan Technologies "applies to
steel from any foreign source, without respect to whether the source country
might be considered friend or foe." Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 913. The
Third Circuit therefore found the Zschernig Court's primary concern inapplicable
and concluded that the Act does not directly interfere with foreign affairs. Id.
45. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 913. According to the Third Circuit
"[tihis is especially true [since] Congress has recently directed its attention to
such restrictions and has taken no steps to preempt them through federal legislation." Id. at 913-14. Looking to "Congress' evident concern with achieving
freer trade on a reciprocal basis," the court suggested that "to strike Pennsylvania's statute would amount to a judicial redirection of established foreign
trade policy-a quite inappropriate exercise of the judicial power." Id. at 914.
46. Id. at 914. The Third Circuit first outlined the controlling vagueness
doctrine, as articulated by the Supreme Court in Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104 (1972). Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 914. The court determined
that "a statute should be struck as vague if (1) it fails to give a person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, or (2) it fails to
provide explicit standards to the enforcing officer." Id.
The Trojan Technologies court also noted that economic regulation is accorded a more permissive vagueness test. Id. (quoting Village of Hoffman Estate v. Flipside, Hoffman Estate, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99 (1982)). The
rationale behind subjecting such regulation to a more lenient vagueness standard lies in the more narrow nature of the subject matter regulated and in the
fact that the "businesses, which face economic demands to plan behavior carefully, can be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of action." Id.
(quoting Hoffman Estate, 455 U.S. at 498-99). Appellants argued, however, that
because the sanctions imposed by the Act are "commercially devastating," the
Act should undergo "relatively strict vagueness review." Id. The Third Circuit
rejected the premise that the sanctions were in fact "commercially devastating,"
and therefore accorded the Act "the more deferential standard usually attendant
on commercial regulation." Id.
According to appellants, the Act was unconstitutionally vague on several
counts. First, appellants asserted that the Act did not clearly identify how much
steel must be contained in the product before it is considered a steel product.
Id. Appellants illustrated this point by inquiring whether a "written report on a
public project held together with a staple is a 'steel product' " under the Act, or
whether a wooden chair which is used by a public agency is considered a "steel
product" because it is held together by steel nails. Trojan Technologies 742 F.
Supp. at 904.
In addition, appellants asserted that the Act failed to provide standards for
determining when steel is "United States steel." Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at
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would not be found unconstitutionally vague unless appellants were
able to establish that the Act is excessively ambiguous as applied to their
activity. 4 7 Because the UV-2000 disinfection system is clearly included
within the statutory definition of steel product, the Third Circuit concluded that the Act's language is sufficiently explicit to "giv[e] appel'48
lants ample warning that their product is within the Steel Act's ambit."
Moreover, the court found that the term "United States steel" is not
inherently vague considering the Act's explicit requirement that the
steel used in a steel product be American-made. 4 9 According to the
court, "the difficulty facing appellants is not that the definition of United
States steel is vague but that as a matter of commercial practice it may
' 50
not always be easy to find steel that satisfies the requirement."
E.

The Equal Protection Clause

Finally, the Third Circuit considered whether application of the Act
violates the equal protection clause. 5 1 Relying on the Supreme Court's
914-15. To illustrate this point appellants asked, "[w]here both foreign and domestic steel are used in a product it is considered a 'steel product,' and acceptable, if 75% of the cost of the 'articles, materials and supplies' have been 'mined,
produced or manufactured' in the United States, but how does one determine
the meaning of the quoted langauge?" Trojan Technologies, 742 F. Supp. at 904.
47. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 915. In support of this assertion, the
Third Circuit relied upon the Supreme Court's opinion in Village of Hoffman
Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982). Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 915. In Hoffman Estates, the Court held that "[a] plaintiff who
engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the
vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others." Hoffman Estates, 455
U.S. at 495.
48. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 915. The statutory definition of steel
product explicitly includes machinery and equipment listed in the United States
Department of Commerce Standard Industrial Classification 35, and sewage purification equipment is a classification included within this category. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 73, § 1886 (Purdon Supp. 1990).
49. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 915. According to the court, Pennsylvania is merely "err[ing] on the side of caution in requiring clear affirmative
evidence that [the] steel being used is entirely of United States origin ....
Id.
50. Id. The court noted that "[ilnability to satisfy a clear but demanding
standard is different from inability in the first instance to determine what the
standard is." Id.
51. Id. Appellants asserted that the Act "attempt[ed] to protect the United
States steel industry by discriminating against foreign competition." Id. (quoting Appellants' Brief, at 18). Relying on Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470
U.S. 869 (1985), the appellants contended that "[sluch a purpose ... is illegitimate under the equal protection clause." Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 915.
In Metropolitan Life, the Supreme Court invalidated a statute that imposed a
significantly lower tax rate on domestic insurance companies than on out-ofstate insurance companies. Metropolitan Life, 470 U.S. at 883. According to the
Court, the domestic preference tax violated the equal protection clause because
it "[gave] the 'home team' an advantage by burdening all foreign corporations
seeking to do business within the State, no matter what they or their States do."
Id. at 878.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss3/7

12

Hasson: Constitutional Law - State Buy American Statute Held a Valid Exer

1991]

THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW

917

recognition that "the Equal Protection Clause permits economic regulation that distinguishes between groups that are legitimately different-as
local institutions so often are," 52 the Third Circuit determined that
53
there was no basis for finding an equal protection violation.
IV.

ANALYSIS

Since the United States Supreme Court has expressly reserved
54
opinion on whether state Buy American legislation is unconstitutional,
the validity of these protectionist provisions remains an area of great
uncertainty. 5 5 Disputes arising from such legislation revolve primarily
52. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 915 (quoting Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v.
Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 180 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). In
Northeast Bancorp, the Supreme Court upheld a state banking act that prohibited
a bank holding company in one state from acquiring a bank located in another
state unless the other state had provided reciprocal privileges to the first state's
banking organizations. Northeast Bancorp, 472 U.S. at 164, 177. Through its
equal protection analysis, the Court concluded that banking is an activity of
"profound local concern." Id. at 177 (citing Lewis v. B.T. Inv. Managers, Inc.,
447 U.S. 27, 38 (1980)). Consequently, the state's interest in protecting such a
"local" industry was found sufficient to successfully defeat an equal protection
challenge. Id. at 177-78.
53. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 915. In finding no basis for an equal
protection violation, the Trojan Technologies court implied that the Pennsylvania
steel industry is such a "local" industry. Id.
54. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437 n.9 (1980) ("We have no occasion to explore the .. .constitutionality of 'Buy American' legislation.").
55. Only two states have as yet evaluated the constitutionality of Buy American legislation, with each reaching disparate conclusions. Compare Bethlehem
Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800
(1969) with K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply
Comm'n, 75 NJ. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977).
In Bethlehem Steel, a California appellate court struck down a California Buy
American provision which required that all public works contractors use only
those products manufactured in the United States. Id. at 229, 80 Cal. Rptr. at
806. The court reasoned that "the California Buy American Act is an unconstitutional encroachment upon the federal government's exclusive power over foreign affairs, and constitutes an undue interference with the United States'
conduct of foreign relations." Id. at 224, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
In contrast, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in K.S.B. Technical Sales, upheld
the New Jersey Buy American provision at issue, concluding that it did not unconstitutionally interfere with the formulation and administration of foreign affairs. K.S.B. Technical Sales, 75 N.J. at 303, 381 A.2d at 789. The provision,
which required use of domestically produced goods in government purchase
contracts, was held to be a permissible exercise in economic protectionism. Id.
at 302-03, 381 A.2d at 789. According to the K.S.B. Technical Sales court, "the
New Jersey Buy American provisions ...do not impermissibly interfere with the
federal government's conduct of foreign affairs," nor do they "constitute proscribed state action under the Commerce Clause, at least in the absence of federal legislation." Id. at 303, 381 A.2d at 789 (citations omitted); accord Delta
Chem. Corp. v. Ocean County Util. Auth., 231 N.J. Super. 180, 554 A.2d 1381
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988) (upholding New Jersey Buy American provision
which was different from protectionist provision at issue in K.S.B.).
Moreover, although several commentators have addressed the issue, there
has not been a consensus of opinion as to either the proper analysis to be ap-
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around three constitutional issues: the preemption doctrine, the foreign
affairs power and the foreign commerce clause. 5 6 The Third Circuit's
opinion in Trojan Technologies definitively resolved each of these issues by
clearly establishing the constitutional standards to be applied by courts
when evaluating state Buy American provisions. First, through its preemption analysis, the Trojan Technologies court adopted the position that
no currently existing federal law precludes states from enacting preferential procurement policies. 5 7 Second, through its examination of the
foreign affairs power, the court intimated that a state's procurement activities will not intrude on the federal government's "formulation and
administration of foreign affairs" provided the activity accords "no opportunity for state administrative officials or judges to comment on...
the nature of foreign regimes." '5 8 Finally, the Trojan Technologies court's
foreign commerce clause analysis, specifically its discussion of the marplied to these provisions or the correct conclusion to be reached. See
Kentworthy, supra note 1, at 20 (analyzing validity of Buy American provision
under commerce clause, foreign affairs power, and United States treaty obligations under General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and concluding that "a
strong argument could be made in support of the validity of... state Buy-American laws"); Note, Foreign Commerce and State Power. The Constitutionalityof State Buy

American Statutes, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 109, 126 (1979) [hereinafter Note, Foreign Commerce] (concentrating on foreign commerce clause analysis to evaluate
state Buy American provisions and concluding that, were correct commerce
clause analysis employed, these statutes would probably be found unconstitutional); Note, State Buy-American Laws-Invalidity of State Attempts to Favor American
Producers, 64 MINN. L. REV. 389, 412 (1980) [hereinafter Note, State Buy-American

Laws] (examining state Buy Americanism under commerce clause and foreign
affairs power, and postulating that either theory provides "independent grounds
for invalidating state buy-American preferences").
56. See Bethlehem Steel, 272 Cal. App. 2d 221, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (evaluating
state Buy American legislation under preemption doctrine and foreign affairs
power); K.S.B. Technical Sales, 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (evaluating state Buy
American provision under preemption doctrine, foreign affairs power and commerce clause);J. KLINE, supra, note 1, at 89-90 (noting that litigation over constitutionality of state Buy American provision usually involves preemption
doctrine, foreign commerce clause and foreign affairs powers); Kentworthy,
supra note 1, at 8 (recognizing that state Buy American provisions are often attacked as violating preemption doctrine, foreign commerce clause and foreign
affairs power).
It should be noted that since the vagueness and equal protection analyses
are statute specific, these issues have not uniformly arisen in the context of Buy
American litigation. This casebrief will therefore limit its analysis to an evaluation of the validity of state Buy American provisions under the preemption doctrine, the foreign affairs power and the foreign commerce clause.
57. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 909. According to the Third Circuit, the
current federal policy reflects an "explicit negotiating strategy" that permits
state legislation, pending the reciprocity of foreign governments. Id. Moreover,
the court concluded that while the federal government has the authority to find
state Buy American legislation "antithetic to the national interest," it has yet to
exercise this authority. Id.
58. Id. at 913. After reviewing the Supreme Court's foreign affairs analysis
in Zschernig, the Third Circuit concluded that a state statute that applies evenhandedly to all foreign products will not have the direct impact on foreign affairs
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ket participant exception, established the bright-line rule that, for purposes of a commerce clause analysis, a local governmental unit is a mere
extension of the state.59 As such, the state can maintain its market participant status regardless of whether purchases are consummated by a
central state agency or a local governmental unit.
A.

Preemption

According to the Third Circuit, "Congressional intent to preempt
[a state's procurement policy] must be 'clear and manifest.' ",60 After examining federal policy as reflected in the agreements and statutes at issue, the Trojan Technologies court concluded that a state's ability to enact
6
Buy American legislation remains "unadulterated." 1
Commentators have attacked this position as being inconsistent
with the tenet that federal trade agreements and statutes represent "the
supreme law of the land."'6 2 However, a review of the agreements, as
well as an examination of the underlying federal policy reveals an acquiescence to, if not an acceptance of, the ability of states to enact restrictive trade provisions. First, none of the asserted agreements purports to
include state governments within its ambit. 63 As such, it would seem
which concerned the Zschernig Court. Id. For a discussion of the holding in
Zschernig, see infra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
59. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 912. Under Pennsylvania law, local governmental units "exist only by grace of state authority," and the Trojan Technologies court therefore concluded that these local bodies are analogous to central
state agencies. Id. at 911-12.
60. Id. at 906 (citingJones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
Whenever an allegedly preempted field is one which "has been traditionally occupied by the States," the congressional intent to preempt must be "clear and
manifest." Id. (quotingJones, 430 U.S. at 525). Because the Third Circuit found
government procurement to be such a field, the court required a showing of
clear and manifest intent to preempt. Id.
61. Id. at 909. The Trojan Technologies court noted that although Congress
and the Executive have complete authority to preempt state procurement policy,
they have yet to exercise that authority. Id.
62. See Zachary, Constitutionality of Buy-American Acts Under the Commerce and
Supremacy Clauses, 8 VA. J. INT'L. L. 151, 160 (1967) (noting that although state
enactments pertain only to state governmental activity, such provisions still impermissibly restrict the federal government's ability to actively pursue trade
agreements and treaties); Note, State Buy-American Laws, supra note 55, at 392-99
(noting that General Agreement on Tariff and Trade represents "supreme law
of the land" and therefore leaves "little latitude for the operation of state buyAmericanism").
63. See UNrrED STATES-CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, S. REP. No. 509,

100th Cong., 2d Sess., at 65, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2395, 2460 (report of Committee on Governmental Affairs) ("[D]iscussions in
the current version of the Agreement were not successful in addressing barriers
below the level of the Federal Government .... ); AGREEMENT ON GOVERNMENT
PROCUREMENT, H.R. Doc. 153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 388, 466, reprinted in 1979
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 381, 664, 726-27 (statement of Administrative Action) ("The Agreement does not cover ...all purchases by State and local
governments .... ); Steel Import Stabilization Act of 1984, 19 U.S.C. § 2253
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anomalous to find state Buy American provisions preempted simply because they appear to be inconsistent with the general promotion of liberalized world trade. Moreover, the federal government's trade
liberalization efforts have recently become focused upon establishing

fair trade, as opposed tofee trade. 64 By adopting this "reciprocity" approach, 6 5 the government intimates that federal policy on international
trade has not yet reached the point where all trade restrictions must be
abandoned. 66 Finally, a federal Buy American provision, which has
(Supp. 1990) (noting that Act is designed to enhance relations between United
States and foreign countries, but never explicitly stating that provisions apply to
state activities); Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.) (stating
purpose of Act as "strengthen[ing] economic relations between the United
States and foreign countries," but never expressly stating that Act applies to
state governments); Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.) (noting that purpose of
Act is "to foster the growth and maintenance of an open world trading system,"
but never explicitly applying provisions to state governments).
64. See R. BALDWIN, TRADE POLICY IN A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY 216-17
(1988) (recognizing increased emphasis placed on fair trade to ensure "a level
playing field" where foreign markets are as open as domestic markets); V.
CANTO, supra note 26, at 1 (noting that "the call for 'free' trade has been joined
by an admonition to seek 'fair' trade," and that "[an increasing number of people have advocated protectionist policies in an effort to create a favorable balance of trade"); Comment, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Its Utility Against
Alleged Unfair Trade Practices by the Japanese Government, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. (1987)
(addressing use of section 301 of Trade Act as vehicle to accomplish fair trade
through use of trade reciprocity).
65. See V. CANTO, supra note 26, at 15-17. According to the reciprocity theory, if any nation fails to eradicate domestic barriers to American-made products, the United States will respond by imposing its own "restrictions and/or
tariffs on [that nation's] exports to the U.S." Id. at 15-16. This economic rationale suggests a return to the "beggar-thy-neighbor" approach advocated in the
early 1930's, since it "requires negotiations with all countries before extension
of the U.S. most-favored-nation (minimum) tariff structure." Id. at 16. At least
one critic of the reciprocity approach has noted, however, that the "grim experience of the early 1930's [should] amply demonstrate[] that this movement toward [reciprocity, and therefore] protectionism, . . . [may be] self-defeating,
impoverishing foreign countries and U.S. citizens alike." Id. at 16.
66. The federal policy of reciprocity would not be furthered by the eradication of all domestic preference provisions since many foreign governments still
retain protectionist measures. See V. CANTO, supra note 26, at 15-16. Japan, for
example, recently restricted the construction of the foundation of their new International Airport solely to Japanese firms. Blustein, Not Quite Perfect: Japan's
New Airport Sinks, Phila. Inquirer, Jan. 3, 1990, at I-A, col. 3. Some critics have
viewed this restriction as reflective of Japan's continued reluctance to open its
markets to foreign participation. Id. at 4-A, col. 1; see also N. FIELEKE, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY UNDER STRESS

135 (1988) (noting Japan's implementation

of "formidable 'invisible' barriers" in form of "[g]overnment procurement policies, the wholesale and retail distribution systems, the setting of product standards, and the testing of products against these standards").
Additionally, the potential threat of retaliation against the United States for
permitting states to enact their own protectionist policies is most likely minimal
since many foreign governments have adopted protectionist tendencies in their
own purchasing decisions. See Note, State and Local Anti-South Africa Action as an
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been in existence since 1933, requires federal agencies purchasing products for use in the United States to expend up to six percent more to
obtain domestically produced commodities. 6 7 The fact that this provision exists and has served as the model for many analogous sub-national
procurement provisions further supports the Third Circuit's conclusion
that state Buy American provisions are not inconsistent with federal policy on international trade.
B.

The Foreign Affairs Power

As noted by the Trojan Technologies court, any state law which directly
involves the state in foreign affairs is unconstitutional. 68 However, because Pennsylvania's Buy American provision applies evenhandedly to
all foreign sources, 69 the Third Circuit surmised that application of this
provision does not violate the foreign affairs power but rather has only
70
an "incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries."
Although this position has been criticized as permitting "an embargo on foreign products [which] amounts to a usurpation by [the]
state of the power of the federal government to conduct foreign trade
policy,"

71

a review of Supreme Court opinions which examine the for-

eign affairs power supports the Third Circuit's holding in Trojan TechnolIntrusion upon the FederalPower in ForeignAffairs, 72 VA. L. REV. 813, 840-41 n.167

(1986) (noting that "[insofar as [the United States] trading partners have so
recognized the protectionist tendencies of governments in their own purchasing
decisions, the threat of economic retaliation against the United States as a result
of state action is even less probable."). According to one author, protectionist
legislation may even lure foreign investment, since "it is a sign that a state is
interested in being responsive to businesses within its borders." J. KLINE, Supra
note 1, at 89.
67. 41 U.S.C. §§ 10a-10d (1988). The federal Buy American Act was enacted to alleviate the economic distress of the Depression and to retaliate against
other countries that had enacted their own protectionist measures. See Note,
Foreign Commerce, supra note 55, at 110-11. The protectionist provision is still in
effect today and governs the purchase of all products "acquired for public use."
41 U.S.C. §§ 10a-10d. For the statutory language of the federal Buy American
provision, see supra note 1.
68. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 913 (citing United States v. Pink, 315
U.S. 203 (1942)).
69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 1881-1887 (Purdon Supp. 1990). Pennsylvania's Buy American provision prohibits the purchase of all foreign products,
regardless of their source. Id.
70. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 913 (quoting Zschernig v. Miller, 389
U.S. 429, 433 (1968)).
71. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, 272 Cal. App. 2d 221,
225, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800, 803 (1969). According to the Bethlehem Steel court, state
Buy American legislation represents "a particular onus to foreign nations since
it may appear to be the product of selfish provincialism, rather than an instrument of justifiable policy." Id. at 228, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 805. Thus, the court
continued, this legislation is an "impermissible attempt by the state to structure
national foreign policy to conform to its own domestic policies." Id.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991

17

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 7

922

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36: p. 905

ogies. In Zschernigv. Miller,72 for example, the Supreme Court invalidated
an Oregon escheat statute which restricted the ability of foreigners to
inherit property from Oregon estates unless the foreign nation provided
reciprocal rights to Oregon residents. 73 In striking down the statute,
the Court concluded that the provision represented "an intrusion by the
State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to
the President and the Congress." 74 It is significant, however, that the
Zschernig Court did not overrule Clark v. Al n, 7 5 a case which upheld a
76
California statute almost identical to the statute at issue in Zschernig.
In finding the two cases consistent, the Zschernig Court noted that, unlike
the statute at issue in Clark, the Oregon statute involved "minute inquiries concerning the actual administration of foreign law . . . [and] the
credibility of foreign diplomatic statements ..... 77 As such, it would
appear that the Supreme Court's primary concern in the foreign affairs
arena focuses upon whether or not the state statute at issue permits
"minute inquiries" into the nature of foreign governments. 78 Because
state Buy American provisions accord governmental purchasers no such
opportunity, the Trojan Technologies court correctly held that such provisions do not directly interfere with the formulation and administration of
foreign affairs.
C.

The Foreign Commerce Clause

In determining if a state's discriminatory activities violate the commerce clause, it must first be determined whether the state is able to
claim protection under the market participant doctrine. 79 Clearly, a
72. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
73. Id. at 430-31, 441. For a complete discussion of the Zschernig case, see
supra note 44 and accompanying text.
74. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 432.
75. 331 U.S. 503 (1947). Writing for the Court in Zschernig,Justice Douglas
noted that "[w]e do not accept the invitation to reexamine our ruling in Clark v.
Allen." Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 432.
76. Clark, 331 U.S. at 506 n.1. In order to inherit under the California Probate Code, a foreign legatee had to establish that his/her country afforded
United States citizens reciprocal rights to inherit from the estates of persons
dying in those foreign countries. Id.
77. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 435. According to the court, these "minute inquiries" impermissibly affected "international relations in a persistent and subtle way." Id. at 440.
78. See Borchers & Dauer, Taming the New Breed of Nuclear Free Zone Ordinances: Statutory and ConstitutionalInfirmities in Local Procurement Ordinances Blacklisting the Producersof Nuclear Weapons Components, 40 HASTINGS L. J. 87, 115 (1988)

(noting that only statutes which require "nonjudgemental construction of foreign standards" are permissible).
79. Although the commerce clause generally prohibits activities which are
designed to promote local interests by discriminating against states or foreign
countries, the United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized an exception to this doctrine when a state or municipality is acting as a market participant rather than a market regulator. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436-
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state government that directly participates in the marketplace is accorded
market participant protection.8 0 The analysis becomes more complex,
however, when the participation in the marketplace is not by the state
8
itself but rather through local governmental bodies and units. '
The Third Circuit adopted the position that there is "no compelling
analytical difference between a local government unit and central state
agencies." '8 2 This conclusion, however, fails to consider the fact that
local governmental units/municipalities possess characteristics which
make them distinguishable from the state in several respects. First, local
83
governments today are often financially independent of the state.
Moreover, a local governmental unit often has the capacity to sue and be
sued as a separate and distinct body. 84 Consequently, it would appear
39 (1980). As noted by one commentator, this distinction has enabled "the
Court [to] shield from Commerce Clause attack blatant favoritism of local interests when a state or municipality [acts as a participator in the marketplace]."
Coenen, supra note 10, at 395.
Some commentators have argued that this exception should not extend to
the realm of foreign commerce. See Note, Foreign Commerce, supra note 55, at 11920 (noting that traditional balancing test should be applied to all regulations
burdening foreign commerce). It is submitted, however, that while regulations
on foreign commerce are clearly subjected to a more rigorous scrutiny, there is
no indication that the market participant exception has been proscribed in such
a setting. Moreover, Professor Tribe has explicitly endorsed the use of the market participant exception in the context of a foreign commerce clause analysis.
L. TRIBE, supra note 20, § 6-21, at 469 (distinguishing between state regulation
of foreign commerce and state participation in foreign commerce and noting
that while former activity is tightly proscribed, there is nothing prohibiting latter
activity); see also, Note State and Municipal Governments React Against South African
Apartheid: An Assessment of the Constitutionalityof the Divestment Campaign, 54 U. CIN.
L. REV. 543, 556-61 (1985) (noting that state can maintain market participant
status even though foreign commerce may be affected).
80. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976). According to the Alexandria Scrap Court, "[n]othing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause forbids a State, in the absence of congressional action, from
participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over
others." Id. (footnotes omitted).
81. In analyzing whether the latter characterization should be accorded
protection under the market participant exception, it must further be determined whether the municipality is an entity unto itself or is simply acting as an
extension of the state. See generally Coenen, supra note 10. If the local body is
found to be an independent unit then the state's regulation will be regulatory
rather than proprietary in nature, and market participant status will be unavailable. Id.
82. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 911. The court concluded that local governments derive all of their power from the state itself and, therefore, the state
should have the ability to restrict this power. Id.
83. Coenen, supra note 10, at 482. As noted by one commentator,
"[d]ifferent localities impose different taxes, issue different types and numbers
of bonds, and save or spend the resources they gather depending on local preferences." Id. As such, when the state mandates that a local governmental unit
distribute its own resources according to state policy, the state is not "redistributing its own largess," but is rather regulating the distribution of another. Id.
84. See, e.g.,
Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
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that the state should not be accorded market participant protection
when its only participation in the marketplace occurs through the guise
of these seemingly independent local bodies.
The Supreme Court, in White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction
Employers, Inc. ,85 recognized that the commerce clause does not restrict
market participant status to the confines of privity of contract. 86 However, the Court's holding in White relied upon the fact that the city was a
financial participant in the public works project at issue. 8 7 Although the
Third Circuit asserted that the state, as the "ultimately controlling public purchaser," is sufficiently involved in all projects included within the
Act's ambit,8 8 the White Court appeared concerned with the extent of
financialparticipation, as distinct from theoretical control.8 9 Relying on
the Supreme Court's holding in White, it would seem that a proper evaluation of Pennsylvania's market participant status should include an inquiry into whether Pennsylvania was a 'financial participant" in the
project at issue. If sufficient financial involvement is found, then the
state should be accorded protection under the market participant exception. If, however, the state has not "expended its own funds" towards
completion of the project, then the state's activities would seem regulatory in nature and market participant status should be unavailable.9 0
U.S. 827 (1979). According to the Rogers court, the fact that a state has the ability to abolish a local governmental unit does not necessarily preclude the local
unit from bringing suit in its individual capacity, even if the claim is asserted
against the state that created it. Id. at 1071.
85. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
86. Id. at 211 n.7. According to the White Court, when a city's regulation

"covers a discrete, identifiable class of economic activity in which the city is a

majorparticipant[,] [e]veryone affected by the order is, in a substantial if informal
sense, 'working for the city.' " Id.
87. Id. at 214-15. The Court articulated its reliance on this limitation when
it held, "[ijnsofar as the city expended only its own funds in entering into construction contracts for public projects, it was a market participant." Id. (empha-

sis added).
88. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 911.
89. White, 460 U.S. at 214-15. The Court's analysis consistently emphasized the fact that the executive order only purported to include within its ambit
projects explicitly permitted by the federal government or in which the city itself
financially participated. Id. at 211 n.7, 212-13, 214-15. Moreover, the Court

defined "major participant" as including only those projects in which the city
had "expended only its own funds." Id. at 214-15. As such, the Court's holding
clearly emphasized the degree offinancialcontrol exercised by the city, as distinct
from theoretical control.
90. A determination that the state is acting as a market regulator, as opposed to a market participant, does not end the inquiry into whether the state
statute violates the commerce clause. To the contrary, a state statute may still be
upheld if it is able to withstand the traditional balancing test espoused by the
Supreme Court in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137 (1970). Under this test, the state must establish a legitimate purpose
for the statute and that no less onerous alternative exists. Id. at 142.
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CONCLUSION

While once the uncontested leader in world trade, the United States
now suffers from a burgeoning trade deficit. 9 1 This simple statistic has
buoyed the popularity of sub-national protectionist procurement legislation. 9 2 But are these Buy American statutes constitutionally permissible
exercises in economic protectionism or are they impermissible vehicles
of discrimination which allow American industry to guarantee sales
while producing inferior products? Because the United States Supreme
Court has expressly reserved opinion on the constitutionality of such
legislation, this remains an area of great uncertainty.
In Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, the Third Circuit resolved
this dispute by establishing the constitutional standards to be applied by
courts in the Third Circuit when evaluating these state Buy American
provisions. First, through its preemption analysis, the court indicates
that there are no currently existing federal laws which preclude the enactment of state Buy American legislation. Second, through its foreign
affairs analysis, the court suggests that a state Buy American provision
will not directly impede the formulation and administration of foreign
affairs if the statute does not permit "minute inquiries" into the nature
of foreign regimes. Finally, through its foreign commerce clause analysis, the court directs that the state can successfully assert market participant status, and thereby avoid a commerce clause challenge altogether,
regardless of whether the actual purchases are completed by central
state agencies or the more independent local governmental units.
It is submitted that the Trojan Technologies court's analysis of the preemption doctrine and the foreign affairs power provides useful guidance
for determining the validity of sub-national procurement legislation. It
is further submitted, however, that the court's foreign commerce clause
analysis, particularly its evaluation of the market participant exception,
may have improperly established a bright-line rule where a more case
specific approach appears warranted. If a state is itself a majorfinancial
participantin a public works project covered by the state's Buy American
provision, then the state should clearly be afforded market participant
status. If, however, the state is merely monitoring the participation of
others, then the state should be forced to forego market participant status and instead be required to satisfy the more traditional commerce
91. R. BALDWIN, supra note 64, at 20 (noting "the emergence and subsequent decline of the United States as a hegemonic power"); Stern & London,
Deficits in Trade and Leadership, 13 THE WASHINGTON Q. No. 4, at 105 (1990) (not-

ing that "[a]s U.S. growth slumped during the 1970s, Germany, Japan, and the
Asian newly industrialized countries (NICs) emerged as full-scale, world-class
competitors").

92. J.

KLINE,

supra note 1, at 87 (noting that "[t]he primary device used by

states to assist their internal industries is the restriction of certain state procurement to goods produced in the United States, so-called buy-American
provisions").
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clause test. According to this test, the statute will only be upheld if the
state is able to establish a substantial state interest, and that no less onerous alternative exists.
Carolinej Hasson
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